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Vol. 14 although proclaiming that "there are few lines in history which have such weight in the library of humanity"12 as the Commission's verdict, Trotsky was incensed that Dewey added personal comments critical of Bolshevism in reporting the Commission's work.13 One of those who initially sided with Dewey Commission critics was Bertrand Russell. When, in 1959, Norman Birnbaum proposed a war crimes trial of Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Macmillan, Russell balked; he doubted that "genuinely impartial people could be found" to conduct the trial.14 Less than a decade later Russell changed his perspective, creating an International War Crimes Tribunal based upon the Dewey Commission and Nuremberg precedents.
B. Post-World War II War Crimes Tribunals
The Nuremberg Tribunal prompted a search for new types of international legal proceedings to cope with the new horrors of the twentieth century. The Tribunal was designed not only to punish criminals, but also to deter future crimes. As Justice Robert Jackson, chief US prosecutor at Nuremberg, claimed in his opening statement, "The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated." 15 Nongovernmental human rights tribunals proceed from a similar sense of urgency. They extend the "spirit of Nuremberg" to condemn a wide range of government repression as criminal. Nongovernmental tribunals resemble the Nuremberg proceedings with respect to the charges brought against government officials, the appeals to public opinion, and the claims of partiality levied by tribunal critics.
The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal considered three charges against Nazi leaders: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Each of the charges, but especially the last, has important human rights implications. As noted in Article 6 of the tribunal's Charter, crimes against humanity include "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds 
S . . whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated."''6
Nongovernmental tribunals are tribunals of conscience, and their legitimacy depends upon public reaction. Lelio Basso's summary at the second session of the Russell Tribunal on Vietnam argued, "Our serious work, the evidence which we have accumulated, the testimonies which we have brought to the knowledge of the public, the search for the truth which we have together pursued, has, in the eyes of public opinion, legitimized our existence."" Tribunal efforts, by documenting and condemning alleged crimes against humanity, seek to ensure that the public assumes legal and moral responsibility, thereby, in Richard Falk's words, [ 
k]eeping Nuremberg [a]live."'8
Nuremberg is kept alive through tribunals in which principles derived from war crimes proceedings are applied to cases of human rights violations. These principles include the imputing of responsibility to superiors of criminals, the obligation of individuals to obey international law (even if to do so conflicts with the orders of superiors), and a conception that international law is flexible and dynamic, rather than static. Due to the slow development of institutions which could implement such principles effectively, the primary target of the Nuremberg and post-Nuremberg appeals has been the public conscience.
Criticisms of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes proceedings resemble those made of contemporary tribunals. Lawyers reared in the Western positivist tradition are often uncomfortable with the view that law has a moral component.19 If government should be one of "laws not 'men'," then moral judgments by self-appointed magistrates are suspect. Judge Pal's dissent in the Tokyo War Crimes judgment claimed that the trial was "a sham employment of legal process for the satisfaction of a thirst for revenge. . . . Formalized vengeance can bring only an ephemeral satisfaction, with every probability of ultimate regret." Pal distinguished the war crimes tribunal from "genuine legal process," which alone could "contribute substantially to the 're-establishment of order and decency in inter- Many proponents of human rights and war crimes tribunals suggest, however, that a genuine legal order which goes beyond positive law does exist and has existed. To recognize and apply this law is a form of retribution, but not of vengeance. An unstated premise, which will now be considered, is that innovative proceedings are necessitated by failed governmental approaches.
C. The Insufficiency of Governmental Approaches
National and international governmental tribunals are often unable or unwilling to implement international human rights standards. In analyzing the World Court's difficulties, Richard Falk notes governments' "short-term cycles of accountability to their national electorates (or if they are authoritarian governments, to the equally short-term expectations of their elites or partymechanisms)."21 Domestic courts implement human rights or Nuremberg principles only with great trepidation. In the United States this was manifest during the Vietnam war, leading many analysts to conclude that, at least in a wartime situation, relief on international law claims would never be forthcoming; "To that extent . . . the Nuremberg principles are without legal effect in domestic courts."22 With respect to human rights standards, the initial optimism spawned by the Filartiga decision23 (in which a federal circuit court of appeal upheld the award of a tort recovery to a Paraguayan doctor whose son was tortured and killed by a member of the military police) was short lived.24 Nicaraguan, German, and French citizens were unable to recover for contra brutality (including torture) because US officials and paramilitary organizations were extended sovereign immunity. The primary reason for the failure of governmental approaches is the simplest: governments are often criminal. In part because of government established rules like the UN Charter's Article 2, Section 7, which exempts domestic affairs from interference by the UN, noncriminal governments are reluctant to raise human rights questions.27 This reluctance is reinforced by the subordination of human rights to geopolitical concerns. Human rights initiatives are therefore more likely to come from individuals and nongovernmental organizations, rather than from governments.
D. Human Rights Tribunals: A Seldom-Discussed Approach
The Nuremberg principles and the rise of human rights NGOs have received extensive attention from scholars and the public; nongovernmental groups which attempt to use public hearings or trials to implement human rights standards, however, are generally ignored. A plausible explanation is that the latter groups are of interest more for their potential than for concrete achievements.
Nongovernmental tribunals differ from other human rights NGOs, such as the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International. Two distinguishing characteristics are that the proceedings are designed to publicly assess information already gathered by experts or brought to the tribunal by witnesses, rather than to provide new information, and that participants in and organizers of the proceedings usually have easily identifiable ideological commitments and motivations. Such commitments and motivations are usually, though not always, acknowledged. Many of Falk's writings convey a sense of despair. He claims that "the most important trend in the future, unfortunately, is the continuing deterioration of international law."38 From this deterioration and "the decline of normative order," Falk maintains, comes the need for a "new Grotius" who will reconceptualize international theory and practice.39 Nongovernmental tribunals may be an arena from which the new Grotius will emerge. Tribunals also successfully avoid the "crackpot realist" traps which Falk condemns and reflect the criteria which Falk set forth for the "world order activist": a lack of humility, a "cosmic" sense of humor, a willingness to welcome contradictions, and an "erotic passion" for justice rather than power.40 In commenting on Falk's criteria, Saul Mendlovitz noted that the only programs which can counter new problems of nuclear annihilation and global repression are those which have only one chance in fifty of achieving their objectives;41 thus the utopian aspect of tribunal activity need not militate against their study. Falk has reservations about popular participation which are reflected in the structuring of human rights tribunals; they are simultaneously elitist and a challenge to current elites. Falk stressed the latter aspect at the PPT on Nicaragua, indicating that the PPT "tries to reinforce this basic claim: that law belongs to all of us, and that we must reclaim it from the destructive forces that are crystallized in imperial power politics at this time."42 Tribunal participants are not the masses, however. Falk finds this fortunate, for the reason that "[t]he simplistic politics of 'power to the people' provides no normative assurance that a better civic order or more enlightened view of international relations would emerge."43 Thus the hope is that tribunal members will be more enlightened than either governmental leaders or the general public. ispheric Affairs Larry Birns, international lawyer Joe Verhoeven, and others.67 The reports which jurors have an opportunity to read are generally extensive. Indeed, they are so extensive that a juror who reads them all will spend more time in preparation than at the tribunal itself.
Historians' accounts are used to bring contextual accuracy to the deliberations. This was especially important for the PPT Session on the Armenian Genocide,68 where only a few witnesses could offer firsthand testimony and revisionist accounts discounting the genocide were widely circulated.
C. The Legal Standards
Legal standards applied by tribunals include some conventional standards applied conventionally, some conventional standards applied unconventionally, and some unconventional standards. Burns Weston indicated that with regard to the nuclear threat, the legal profession must "be receptive to more than we find in the procrustean bed of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice" and must "be receptive to seeing our profession as a noble undertaking as well as a vocational craft."''6 It is in this spirit that tribunals select and develop their legal standards. 
Morality as a Legal Standard
Legal standards are frequently intertwined with political or moral standards. In part this reflects a dissatisfaction with the legal standards and a desire to build a political movement. It also reflects a realization that human rights monitoring must extend beyond merely distinguishing legal from illegal practices.73 As was made clear at Nuremberg, repression is often bolstered by law, and human rights advocacy is often illegal. 
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The "crimes" publicized by tribunals are often cited without reference to positive law: it is the inhumane character of certain practices which makes them criminal.74 This raises questions of procedure, since where tribunals investigate the rights of indigenous peoples or superpower intervention practices innumerable inhumane practices might be condemned. The methods by which the tribunal selects and evaluates a small subset of governments' moral crimes merit careful scrutiny. 
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